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The State's Interpretation of Crawford is Overbroad 
The State argues that the opinion in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 
1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) leads to the conclusion that "[t]he admission of preliminary 
hearing testimony by a witness who later becomes unavailable does not offend the 
Confrontation Clause." Respondent's brief at 5. In fact, Crawford held only that where 
"testimonial" hearsay is at issue, the Confrontation Clanse demands that it be admitted for use 
against the defendant only when there exists both (1) unavailability of the declarant and (2) a 
prior opportunity for cross examination. Crawford at 68. Preliminary hearing testimony is 
"testimonial." Id. Therefore, Crawford holds that preliminary hearing testimony may only be 
admitted for use against the defendant when there is a prior opportunity for cross-examination; 
the logical corollary to this holding is that not all preliminary hearing testimony may be 
admitted. If the Court had meant that preliminary hearing testimony categorically satisfies the 
Confrontation Clause, then it certainly could and would have said so. Instead, the Court 
imposed conditions on the admission of preliminary hearing testimony, thereby acknowledging 
that not all such testimony passes constitutional muster. 
The State highlights several of the cases mentioned by the Court in its review of its 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Of Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 
L.Ed. 409 (1895), Respondent states that the Court "noted that the defendant had, at the first 



























trial, an adequate opportunity to confront the witness, and that the constitutional protection is 
grounded in the 'advantage' of 'seeing the witness face to face, and of subjecting him to the 
ordeal of cross-examination." Respondent's brief at 6 (citation omitted). First, the testimony at 
issue in Mattox was that of a witness who testified at a prior trial, not at a preliminary hearing. 
Id. at 241. Appellant does not argue that the admission of prior trial testimony is insufficient to 
pass constitutional muster, but rather that Idaho preliminary hearing testimony is insufficient as 
a general rule, and that specifically the preliminary hearing testimony at issue in this case 
should not have been admitted. Second,Appellant agrees that the constitutional protection is 
grounded in the advantage of subjecting the witness to the ordeal of cross-examination. The 
problem is that Idaho preliminary hearing procedure does not allow for meaningful cross-
examination sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause and that Mr. Mantz was not afforded 
confrontation in this case as guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause. 
The State argues that the Crawford Court "noted with approval its holding in 
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), where the preliminary hearing testimony of a 
witness was admitted at trial. In that case the defendant had had an opportunity for cross-
examination and had waived it, but the testimony was disallowed because the 
government had not established the witnesses [sic] unavailability." Respondent's brief at 
7 ( citations omitted.) What the State fails to mention is that the Barber court stated that it 
would have reached the same conclusion even if the defendant had cross-examined the 
witness at the preliminary hearing, because a preliminary hearing is a truncated procedure 
which does not allow for the same scope of cross-examination as a trial: 



























Moreover, we would reach the same result on the facts of this case had petitioner's 
counsel actually cross-examined Woods at the preliminary hearing. The right to 
confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the opportunity to cross-examine 
and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness. A preliminary 
hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a 
trial, simply because its function is the more limited one of determining whether 
probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial. While there may be some 
justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a 
preliminary hearing satisfies the demand of the confrontation clause where the witness 
is shown to be actually unavailable, this is not, as we have pointed out, such a case. 
Barber at 725-726 (citations omitted). 
Lastly, the State emphasizes the following dicta quote from Crawford: "Even our 
recent cases, in their outcomes, hew closely to the traditional line. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S., at 
67-70, 100 S.Ct. 2531, admitted testimony from a preliminary hearing at which the defendant 
had examined the witness." Respondent's brief, p. 7 (citation omitted). First, as explained 
above, the Court could have held that preliminary hearing cross-examinations always pass 
Confrontation Clause muster, but did not do so. Second, this brief statement in the lengthy 
majority opinion appears calculated to blunt the criticism made in the concurrence-in-the-
judgment that the majority unnecessarily overruled Roberts in the face of stare decisis. See 
Crawford at 69 and 75. The majority opinion in Crawford repeatedly addresses the arguments 
of the concurrence in a direct manner. See, e.g., Footnotes 3, 5, 7. 9, and 10. Third, the precise 
issue presented in the case at bar, i.e., that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the State from 
introducing into evidence in its case in chief the preliminary hearing testimony of an 
unavailable witness, was analyzed in detail by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in State v. 
Stuart, 695 N.W. 2d 259 (Wisc. 2005) and by the Supreme Court of Colorado in People v. Fry, 



























92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004). These cases were thoroughly discussed in Appellant's opening brief, 
and both courts interpreted the Confrontation Clause post-Crawford as Mr. Mantz asks this 
Court to do. 
II. 
The State Constitutional Issue is Properly Before the Court 
The State argues that this Court should not consider Mr. Mantz's request for relief under 
the Idaho Constitution because Mr. Mantz "provided no argument or authority in support of his 
claim" and because Mr. Mantz "did not raise these independent grounds before the trial court." 
Respondent's brief, p. 8. In support of the latter claim, the State cites the record at pp. 184-202. 
The State misstates the record in this case. Mr. Mantz raised the state constitutional 
issue before the District Court at three separate points in the record. In his Brief in Opposition 
to State's Motion in Limine filed on 24 October 2007, Mr. Mantz argued to the District Court, 
"Based on Idaho and federal law, Mr. Mantz was denied an adequate "opportunity" to cross-
examine Mr. Hoidal at the preliminary hearing and, therefore, the admission of the preliminary 
hearing transcript under a hearsay exception would violate Mr. Mantz's rights of confrontation 
under the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions." R. Vol. I. p. 185 (emphasis added). In the same brief 
submitted to the District Court, Mr. Mantz stated in the conclusion," ... and Mr. Mantz's 
confrontation rights under the 6th Amendment and Article I,§ 13 have not been satisfied, and 
therefore, the preliminary hearing transcript of Karl Hoidal's testimony should not be 
admitted." R. Vol. I. p. 202 (emphasis added). This is clearly a reference to the Idaho 



























Constitution because there is no Section 13 in Article I of the U.S. Constitution and because 
Mr. Mantz made the same citation to the Idaho Constitution in his written motions in limine. In 
the Defendant's Motions in Limine filed on 24 October 2007 in the District Court, Mr. Mantz 
sought exclusion of Mr. Hoidal's preliminary hearing testimony "on the grounds that such 
testimony would violate Mr. Mantz's confrontation rights under Art. I,§ 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution and the 6th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution .... " R. Vol. I. pp. 204-205 
(emphasis added). Thus, the State's contention that "Mantz did not raise these independent 
grounds before the trial court" is without merit because the record demonstrates that Mr. Mantz 
raised the issue clearly, in writing, and in more than one pleading to the District Court. 
The State's argument that Mr. Mantz "provided no argument or authority in support of 
his claim" is similarly unpersuasive because lengthy detailed analysis was provided regarding 
the confrontation issue in Section I of the Appellant's Brief. This analysis include policy 
considerations as well as numerous citations to persuasive authority, including Stuart and Fry, 
supra. This argument was incorporated by reference in Section II of the Appellant's opening 
brief. The reason for incorporating the argument by reference was clearly set forth: that 
" ... Crawford was a watershed event in confrontation analysis. It overruled longstanding 
precedent regarding a defendant's rights at a criminal trial." Appellant's brief, p. 23. 
Presumably, if the entire analysis had been copied and pasted into Section II of Appellant's 
brief, then the State would not have argued that Mr. Mantz "provided no argument or authority 
in support of his claim." That would be a nonsensical waste of judicial resources and paper, 



























and it is not required by the cases to which the State has cited. For these reasons, the state 
constitutional issue is properly before this tribunal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in the opening brief in this case, this Court should 
vacate Mr. Mantz's conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
DATED this 22nd day of May 2009. 
WHITNEY & WHITNEY, LLP 
ISi THOMAS W. WHITNEY 
By: Thomas W. Whitney 
Attorneys for Appellant Tim C. Mantz 
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